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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Mass-tort liability of entities with asbestos operations 
typically results in their filing for bankruptcy protection. The 
Bankruptcy Code allows a court to supplement a confirmed 
plan of reorganization by entering an injunction that channels 
this liability to a trust set up to compensate persons injured by 
the debtor’s asbestos. 
In certain circumstances, channeling injunctions can 
also protect the interests of non-debtors, such as insurers. The 
question we answer is whether the claims of plaintiffs in 
litigation begun in Montana (the “Montana Plaintiffs” or 
simply “Plaintiffs”) fit a channeling injunction’s coverage.  
The Plaintiffs are a group of individuals suffering from 
asbestos disease as a result of exposure to the asbestos mining 
and processing operations in Libby, Montana (the “Libby 
Facility”) of W.R. Grace & Co. and its related entities 
(collectively “Grace”). They seek to hold Grace’s insurers, 
Continental Casualty Company and Transportation Insurance 
Company (collectively “CNA”), liable under various state-
law negligence theories for their injuries (the “Montana 
Claims”). CNA, however, seeks to enforce a third-party-
claims channeling injunction (the “Injunction”) entered under 
Grace’s confirmed plan of reorganization (the “Grace Plan”) 
to bar the Montana Plaintiffs’ action.  
As the Montana Claims fit the text of the Injunction 
and are not excluded from it, we affirm the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision as it pertains to this issue. We do not decide, 
however, whether it could bar the Montana Claims within the 
limits of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4). Instead, we vacate this 
portion of the Court’s decision and remand for it to make this 
determination per the guidelines we note. 
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I.  Background 
A.  Channeling of Third-Party Claims in   
  Asbestos Bankruptcy 
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes 
bankruptcy courts to form a trust and issue an injunction to 
channel certain claims to that trust in conjunction with a 
confirmed plan of reorganization in asbestos bankruptcies. In 
re Quigley Co., Inc., 676 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2012); In re 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 n.46 (3d Cir. 
2004), as amended (Feb. 23, 2005). The injunction bars 
asbestos-related actions against the debtor and claims against 
certain third parties who are alleged to be directly or 
indirectly liable for the debtor’s conduct along with claims or 
demands against it. §§ 524(g)(1)(B), (4)(A)(ii). Instead, those 
actions are directed to the trust, “generally funded by 
insurance proceeds and securities in the reorganized debtor,” 
which assumes the asbestos liabilities. In re Plant Insulation 
Co., 734 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2013); see also In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2013); In re 
Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 
2012); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869, 877 (9th 
Cir. 2012), as amended (Apr. 3, 2012). 
Congress intended § 524(g) to address the “unique 
problems and complexities associated with asbestos liability,” 
Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234, particularly the “long 
latency period of many asbestos-related diseases, which . . . 
typically creates a large pool of future claimants whose 
disease has not yet manifested.” W.R. Grace, 729 F.3d at 323; 
see also Plant Insulation, 734 F.3d at 905–06; Quigley, 676 
F.3d at 58–59; H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348. The statute 
“seeks to use the broad equitable power of the bankruptcy 
court to resolve th[is] dilemma in a way that is fair for both 
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present and future asbestos claimants.” Plant Insulation, 734 
F.3d at 906. It “allows companies to emerge from bankruptcy 
free of asbestos liability,” W.R. Grace, 729 F.3d at 315, and 
to “facilitate[] [their] ongoing viability, which in turn 
provides . . . trust[s] with an ‘evergreen’ source of funding to 
pay future claims,” id. at 320 (citing Combustion Eng’g, 391 
F.3d at 234) (quotation marks omitted). Many statutory 
prerequisites designed to ensure fairness must be met before a 
trust is formed and a channeling injunction entered under 
§ 524(g). Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234 n.45 
(describing statutory prerequisites under 
§§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I)–(IV), (ii)(I)–(V)); see also W.R. Grace, 
729 F.3d at 320.  
Relevant here is the injunction and channeling of 
certain actions against CNA as a third party. Under 
§ 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), 
[a third-party-claims channeling] injunction 
may bar any action directed against a third party 
who is identifiable from the terms of such 
injunction . . . and is alleged to be directly or 
indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims 
against, or demands on the debtor to the extent 
such alleged liability of such third party arises 
by reason of—  
(I) the third party’s ownership of a financial 
interest in the debtor, a past or present affiliate 
of the debtor, or a predecessor in interest of the 
debtor; 
(II) the third party’s involvement in the 
management of the debtor or a predecessor in 
interest of the debtor, or service as an officer, 
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director or employee of the debtor or a related 
party; 
(III) the third party’s provision of insurance to 
the debtor or a related party; or 
(IV) the third party’s involvement in a 
transaction changing the corporate structure, or 
in a loan or other financial transaction affecting 
the financial condition, of the debtor or a related 
party[.] 
Id. Gateway keys are whether the third parties are identifiable 
(as opposed to specifically identified) by the injunction and 
whether the liability results, even if indirectly, from the 
debtor. Protecting third parties like CNA against actions 
alleging derivative liability “provide[s] [them with] an 
incentive . . . to contribute to the trust.” Quigley, 676 F.3d at 
59. They are provided this incentive because continued 
exposure to indirect asbestos claims would create a “lingering 
uncertainty regarding the scope of [their] liability [that] 
would threaten the debtor’s recovery and hinder Congress’s 
objective of providing an ‘evergreen’ source of funding to 
pay future claims.” W.R. Grace, 729 F.3d at 325 (citing 
Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
B.  Facts 
 We have previously discussed extensively the facts 
surrounding Grace asbestos operations and its bankruptcy. In 
re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 332, 335–39 (3d Cir. 2013); 
In re W.R. Grace & Co., 532 F. App’x 264, 265–66 (3d Cir. 
2013); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 167–70 (3d 
Cir. 2009); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 316 F. App’x 134, 135–
36 (3d Cir. 2009); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 115 F. App’x 565, 
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566 (3d Cir. 2004). So we include here only the pertinent 
undisputed facts taken largely from the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-01139, 2016 
WL 6068092, at *1–4 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 17, 2016). 
 CNA issued a variety of insurance policies to Grace 
between 1973 and 1985, including policies for workers’ 
compensation and employers’ liability (collectively the 
“Workers’ Compensation & Employers’ Liability Policies” or 
“CNA Policies”).1 See Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts of Continental Casualty Company and Transportation 
Insurance Company in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (“CNA SUF”) ¶ 20, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 2016 
WL 6068092 (No. 01-01139). Within the latter group of CNA 
Policies, CNA is granted the right to inspect the Libby 
Facility: 
Inspection and Audit: [CNA] . . . shall . . . be 
permitted but not obligated to inspect at any 
reasonable time the workplaces, operations, 
machinery and equipment covered by this 
policy. Neither the right to make inspections nor 
the making thereof nor any report thereon shall 
constitute an undertaking on behalf of or for the 
benefit of [Grace] or others, to determine or 
warrant that such workplaces, operations, 
                                              
1 The CNA Policies relevant to this appeal are the Workers’ 
Compensation & Employers’ Liability Policies No. WC 
1205050R (1973–76) and No. WC 159 9420 (1977–85). We 
do not see the relevance of CNA Policy No. WC 5 07415909 
(1991–92) issued by the Transportation Insurance Company 
(a CNA Company) because the Libby Facility was closed in 
1990 and the policy applies only to injuries that occurred 
during the policy period. 
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machinery or equipment are safe or healthful, or 
are in compliance with any law, rule or 
regulation. 
Workers’ Compensation & Employers’ Liability Policies No. 
WC 1205050R (1973–76) at ¶ 4, No. WC 159 9420 (1977–
85) at ¶ 4 (emphasis in original).  
After Grace filed voluntary chapter 11 petitions in the 
District of Delaware, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the 
Grace Plan. It included the Injunction under § 524(g) barring 
certain suits against third parties and instead channeling them 
to an asbestos personal injury trust (the “Asbestos PI Trust”) 
designed to compensate those injured by Grace’s asbestos. 
The Injunction states in pertinent part: 
On and after the Effective Date, the sole 
recourse of the Holder of an Asbestos PI Claim 
. . . shall be to the Asbestos PI Trust . . .[,] and 
such Holder shall have no right whatsoever at 
any time to assert its Asbestos PI Claim . . . 
against . . . any other Asbestos Protected Party 
. . . . [A]ll such Holders permanently and 
forever shall be stayed, restrained, and enjoined 
from taking any and all legal or other actions or 
making any Demand against any Asbestos 
Protected Party . . . for the purpose of, directly 
or indirectly, claiming, collecting, recovering, 
or receiving any payment, recovery, 
satisfaction, or any other relief whatsoever on, 
of, or with respect to any Asbestos PI Claims 
. . . other than from the Asbestos PI Trust . . . . 
It applies “only to the extent[] provided by [§] 524(g) . . . .” 
Excluded from the Injunction’s reach are “rights or 
obligations [that] pertain solely to coverage for” “[c]laim[s] 
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. . . for benefits under a state[-]mandated workers’ 
compensation system.”  
Along with the Grace Plan, CNA and Grace entered 
into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) in 
which CNA agreed to contribute $84 million over a period of 
six years to the Trust, $13 million of which could be 
reimbursed for any payments CNA makes for asbestos 
personal injury claims that are not successfully channeled to 
the Trust. 
C.  Procedural History 
Plaintiffs filed the Montana Claims in that State 
against CNA, see CNA SUF ¶ 38, alleging it breached a duty 
of care. Specifically, the Montana Claims allege: 
161. CNA was negligent in [its] undertaking to 
provide [industrial hygiene] services: 
(a) in failing to recommend or require sufficient 
measures and standards for employee education, 
warning the workers, their families and the 
community, protection against asbestos dust 
going into workers’ homes and into the 
community, dust control (including 
housekeeping, ventilation, exhaust air cleaning 
and maintenance) and medical monitoring; 
(b) in failing to sufficiently test and monitor the 
effectiveness of dust control at all locations 
where there was dust; 
(c) in failing to obtain medical information on 
the incidence of disease and deaths at the Grace 
operations from Grace and from public 
agencies; and 
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(d) in failing to sufficiently study and use the 
information on dust control and asbestos 
disease that it did have. 
162. CNA’s representatives with expertise in 
industrial hygiene inspected the Grace Libby 
operations. 
163. In so doing, CNA had a duty of reasonable 
care to the Libby workers, their families and to 
the community. 
164. CNA was negligent in inspection of the 
Grace Libby operations, in failing to report and 
act upon known hazardous conditions due to 
insufficient worker education, insufficient 
warnings to workers, their families and to the 
community, insufficient dust control . . . , and 
insufficient medical monitoring. 
165. As a direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of CNA, Plaintiffs have suffered 
from asbestos[-]related bodily injuries and 
incurred the damages alleged herein. 
 CNA filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Montana Claims fall 
under the Injunction and accordingly must be enjoined and 
channeled to the Trust. The Montana Plaintiffs filed a motion 
to dismiss and CNA filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The Asbestos PI Trust filed a brief as amicus curiae in 
support of CNA. The Court, after hearing oral argument on 
the motions, decided the Montana Claims must be enjoined 
and thus denied the Montana Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and 
granted summary judgment to CNA. W.R. Grace, 2016 WL 
6068092, at *1. 
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 First, the Court considered whether the language of 
§ 524(g)(4)(a) limits the scope of the Injunction such that it 
does not bar the Montana Claims. It separately addressed (1) 
whether the Montana Claims allege CNA is directly or 
indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims against, or 
demands on Grace, and (2) whether the alleged liability exists 
“by reason of” CNA’s providing insurance to Grace.  
In answering the former, the Court relied on our 
opinion in Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d 190, and the 
Bankruptcy Court’s ruling in In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 
453 B.R. 570 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011). It found that the 
Montana Claims are “derivative,” i.e., they seek to hold CNA 
directly or indirectly liable for Grace’s conduct, because the 
underlying injuries are based on exposure to Grace’s asbestos 
products or operations.  
The Court then decided the Montana Claims can only 
exist “by reason of” CNA’s provision of insurance to Grace 
because any alleged duty CNA has to conduct industrial 
hygiene services arises from the parties’ insurance policies. 
The Court also ruled the Injunction does not exceed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction because the Trust has a 
contractual obligation to reimburse CNA for liability from 
personal injury claims (including the Montana Claims) 
affecting the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Finally, it 
rejected the Montana Plaintiffs’ assertion that CNA’s 
providing insurance is not legally relevant to the Montana 
Claims, finding instead that they stem from CNA’s insurance 
to Grace.  
Second, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ contention that 
(1) the Montana Claims trace to CNA’s Workers’ 
Compensation & Employers’ Liability Policies covering 
Grace, and (2) thus the Injunction does not enjoin those 
actions. It found the exception to the Injunction is for 
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workers’ compensation claims, not policies, and none of the 
Montana Claims are for workers’ compensation. It also 
concluded that, due to the Injunction’s workers’ 
compensation carve-out, there is no risk of federal bankruptcy 
law preempting a state workers’ compensation scheme in this 
context. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We granted a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2). We review de novo the Court’s grant of summary 
judgment, In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d 515, 522 (3d 
Cir. 2017), and we affirm only if, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Montana Plaintiffs, we conclude 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is only appropriate if no 
reasonable jury could find the Montana Claims were not 
included under the terms of the Injunction or could not be 
included in it under § 524(g)(4). 
III.  Discussion 
 We review the issues on appeal in the order they were 
briefed (which differs from their order in the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision).  
A.  Applying the Injunction to the Montana 
Claims 
We turn first to the Montana Plaintiffs’ argument that 
the Injunction does not, by its terms, bar the Montana Claims. 
We have reviewed the Grace Plan, the Settlement Agreement, 
and the CNA Workers’ Compensation & Employers’ 
Liability Policies. We conclude that the CNA Policies are 
among those covered by the Injunction’s terms, though buried 
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in a befuddling maze of defined terms, and that the Montana 
Claims do not fall under the Injunction’s workers’ 
compensation exclusion.  
Claims barred by the Injunction include tort claims 
made against certain protected third parties directly or 
indirectly resulting from personal injury and exposure to 
Grace’s asbestos. Third parties protected from these claims 
include CNA and other insurance companies who entered into 
settlement agreements with Grace. They are protected, 
however, only to the extent their policies are identified as 
subject to a settlement agreement.  
Twenty-five CNA policies are identified in the 
Settlement Agreement, along with a catch-all for “all known 
and unknown policies, or portions of policies,” issued by 
CNA to Grace through June 30, 1985 that actually or 
potentially provide insurance coverage for asbestos-related 
claims of bodily injury. These asbestos-related claims include 
any made against Grace or CNA “arising in whole or in part 
(directly or indirectly) by reason of” CNA’s provision of 
insurance to Grace, if these claims involve bodily injury 
caused by Grace’s asbestos. The Settlement Agreement 
specifically covers any claims alleging CNA has a duty to 
provide industrial hygiene, conduct inspections, provide 
warnings or educational services, or protect third parties from 
the danger of asbestos exposure. As noted, excluded from 
protection are any rights or obligations that pertain solely to 
CNA’s coverage for state workers’ compensation benefits. 
The Montana Plaintiffs argue the CNA Workers’ 
Compensation & Employers’ Liability Policies are not 
included among the 25 listed policies and thus are not 
covered by the Injunction. Our review, however, shows that 
CNA entered into a settlement agreement with Grace, that the 
catch-all for all “known and unknown policies” includes the 
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CNA Policies, and that the CNA Policies provide coverage 
for bodily injuries caused by Grace asbestos. Hence they are 
covered by the Injunction though they are not specifically 
listed. 
  Plaintiffs further contend that claims against CNA may 
not be enjoined because it is a workers’ compensation insurer. 
This argument misreads the workers’ compensation carve-
out: it excludes from the Injunction rights or obligations that 
pertain solely to workers’ compensation benefits.2 CNA 
provided not only workers’ compensation coverage but also 
employers’ liability coverage; provisions of the CNA Policies 
that pertain to both workers’ compensation and employers’ 
liability coverage do not “pertain solely” to workers’ 
compensation and thus are not excluded. The provisions 
relevant to the Montana Claims—those that give CNA the 
right, but not the obligation, to inspect the Libby Facility’s 
industrial hygiene—apply to both types of coverage. They 
appear outside the sections on employers’ liability and 
workers’ compensation, and, unlike other provisions in the 
CNA Policies, they contain no indication that they apply to 
one type of coverage to the exclusion of the other. 
Accordingly, claims tied to these provisions are barred by the 
Injunction’s terms. 
The Montana Plaintiffs ask us to interpret the Plan and 
Settlement Agreement’s terms to preserve all of CNA’s duties 
as a workers’ compensation insurer and all rights of workers’ 
compensation claimants (which, they allege, state law 
requires). To do otherwise, they claim, would impermissibly 
preempt state law. We agree with the Bankruptcy Court and 
see no conflict between our interpretation of these 
                                              
2 We depart from the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the 
exception is for workers’ compensation claims; it is for rights 
or obligations that pertain solely to those claims. 
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documents’ terms and the state workers’ compensation 
obligations to which Plaintiffs refer.3 Provisions of the CNA 
Policies that solely cover claims to state workers’ 
compensation benefits are excluded from the terms of the 
Injunction, and, moreover, the Montana Plaintiffs do not 
allege any violation of state workers’ compensation laws. In 
this context, we see no risk that the Grace Plan or the 
Settlement Agreement would preempt Montana workers’ 
compensation law. 
B.  The Permissible Scope of the Injunction 
 under Section 524(g)(4) 
To repeat, § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) allows third-party-claims 
channeling injunctions to “bar any action directed against a 
third party who is identifiable . . . and is alleged to be directly 
or indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims against, or 
demands on the debtor to the extent such alleged liability . . . 
arises by reason of” one of four statutory relationships 
between the third party and the debtor. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). 
The parties do not dispute that CNA is identified as protected 
by the Injunction; this satisfies the first condition for coverage 
by a third-party-claims channeling injunction. We assess only 
the second and third conditions for protection: whether the 
Montana Claims seek to hold CNA “directly or indirectly 
liable for the conduct of, claims against, or demands on” 
Grace, i.e., the “derivative liability” requirement, and whether 
CNA’s alleged liability “arises by reason of” its provision of 
insurance to Grace, i.e., the “statutory relationship” 
                                              
3 They cite obligations under Montana law that include 
reporting, investigation, and notification requirements for 
workers’ compensation claims. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 39–71–101, et seq. 
 
 17 
 
requirement. See, e.g., Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 234–
35 (distinguishing the “derivative liability” requirement from 
the “statutory relationship” requirement). 
i.  The “Derivative Liability” 
Requirement 
The Montana Plaintiffs contend that the Montana 
Claims do not seek to hold CNA “directly or indirectly liable 
for the conduct of, claims against, or demands on” Grace and, 
as a result, may not be enjoined under § 524(g)(4). They 
argue that unlike direct or indirect actions against CNA to 
recover from its insurance policies for Grace’s liabilities, the 
Montana Claims, which are based on CNA’s own misconduct, 
are beyond the Injunction’s scope. CNA disagrees. It repeats 
the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that suits against it for 
allegedly failing to prevent injuries caused by Grace’s 
asbestos operations are per se attempts to hold it indirectly 
liable for the conduct of and claims against Grace.  
In Combustion Engineering we interpreted the relevant 
statutory language to permit channeling injunctions to enjoin 
“actions against third parties . . . where a third party has 
derivative liability for the claims against the debtor.” 391 
F.3d at 234. By contrast, “the plain language of the statute 
makes clear[] [it] does not permit the extension of a 
channeling injunction to include . . . non-derivative third-
party actions,” i.e., “claims against [third parties that] allege 
independent liability[] wholly separate from any liability 
involving [the debtor].” Id. at 235. With this understanding, 
we are not convinced by either the Montana Plaintiffs’ or 
CNA’s interpretation of § 524(g)(4) because the former is 
overly narrow and the latter overly broad.  
We first set aside the Montana Plaintiffs’ attempt to 
constrain the meaning of “direct[] or indirect[] liab[ility] for 
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the conduct of, claims against, or demands on” a debtor to 
actions for insurance proceeds. In an insurance context, a 
direct action against an insurer—whereby a beneficiary may 
sue the insurer directly rather than sue the insured—is no 
doubt an attempt to hold the insurer “directly liable” for 
claims against its insured. But the statute’s text in no way 
indicates that this is the sole form of an insurer’s “direct[] 
liab[ility]” for the conduct of, claims against, or demands on a 
debtor. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). And nothing in the statute’s text 
supports indirect insurer liability only where a claimant seeks 
to recover from insurance proceeds.  
Additionally, that a third party is alleged to have 
engaged in some wrongdoing is not enough to render a claim 
against it independent if its liability depends on the debtor’s 
liability.4 Theories of liability exist that involve a third-
party’s wrongdoing but are no less derivative of a principal’s 
                                              
4 The Montana Plaintiffs cite to the Second Circuit’s decision 
in In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008), 
rev’d sub nom. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 
(2009), to support their position. Beyond the fact that the 
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, it involved a 
channeling injunction entered into prior to the enactment of 
§ 524(g)(4), and, further, in that case “it [was] undisputed that 
many of the plaintiffs [sought] to recover from [the insurer], 
not indirectly for [the debtor’s] wrongdoing, but for [the 
insurer’s] own alleged violations of state law.” Bailey, 557 
U.S. at 143. This stands in contrast to the dispute before us, 
which centers on whether, following § 524(g)(4), the 
Montana Claims seek to recover from CNA directly or 
indirectly for Grace’s wrongdoing.  
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wrongdoing or liability.5 See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. 
FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d 212, 224 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Quigley, 676 F.3d at 60; cf. In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84, 
88–89 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 
1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining indirect respondeat 
superior liability and direct liability through failure to 
supervise); Gass v. V.I. Tele. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 410, 414 
(1965)). 
Likewise, CNA’s proposed interpretation is equally 
unpersuasive: that a debtor’s product caused a plaintiff’s 
injury is not enough to render a third party liable “for the 
conduct of, claims against, or demands on the debtor.” After 
our decision in Combustion Engineering, the Bankruptcy 
Court agreed with CNA’s position and found claims against 
protected third parties based on the claimant’s injury from or 
exposure to the debtor’s asbestos products were “derivative.”6 
                                              
5 We do not overlook a third-party’s “direct[] or indirect[] 
liab[ility]” based on claims for which it is not alleged to have 
engaged in any independent wrongdoing. In the context of 
insurance, examples include indemnification or contribution 
claims brought by a non-settling insurer against a settling 
insurer for payments made due to the debtor’s liability. See 
Plant Insulation, 734 F.3d at 911; Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 980, 982 (1st Cir. 1995). 
Another example, outside the insurance context, is successor 
liability. Quigley, 676 F.3d at 60. 
 
6 CNA contends our decision in W.R. Grace, 729 F.3d 311, 
agrees with its position. It misconstrues the legal issue and 
our reasoning in that case. The State of Montana and the 
Canadian Crown sought indemnification from Grace for 
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See In re Pittsburgh Corning, 417 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2006) (“[T]o the extent [the third parties] are 
alleged to be jointly and severally liable for [the debtor’s] 
products . . . or conduct, . . . we find that the claims against 
the [third parties] are derivative and can be channeled under 
§ 524(g).”). Such a rule, however, has the potential to include 
third-party liability that is wholly separate from a debtor’s 
liability.  
The involvement of the debtor’s asbestos is relevant, 
but not dispositive. For instance, where the third-party’s 
liability is based on exposure to a non-debtor’s asbestos, it is 
clearly not derivative of the conduct of or a claim against the 
debtor. See Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 231. But there 
may be cases in which the involvement of the debtor’s 
product is only incidental (for example, if a piece of building 
material containing Grace asbestos in a CNA office fell and 
                                                                                                     
failure-to-warn suits brought against them. Their effort came 
into conflict with § 524(g)(1)(B), which allows an injunction 
to bar legal actions for the purpose of “directly or indirectly 
collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with 
respect to any claim or demand that, under a plan of 
reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by a trust 
. . . .” Id. The issue was not whether Montana and the 
Crown’s liability was “indirect;” rather, it was whether 
indemnification by Grace would constitute “indirectly 
collecting . . . with respect to any claim . . . that . . . is to be 
paid . . . by [the] [T]rust . . . .” § 524(g)(1)(B). The claim for 
indemnification depended on whether Grace was liable for 
the underlying personal injury suits, and claims of that sort in 
indemnification suits were properly channeled to the Trust. 
729 F.3d at 324. 
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struck someone). There too the presence of the debtor’s 
asbestos would not render the third-party’s liability 
derivative.  
The proper inquiry is to review the law applicable to 
the claims being raised against the third party (and when 
necessary to interpret state law) to determine whether the 
third-party’s liability is wholly separate from the debtor’s 
liability or instead depends on it.7 This does not require the 
reviewing court to decide state-law claims on the merits. It 
does, however, require it to ascertain what liability under the 
relevant law demands. We do not undertake this analysis here 
because we have not been fully briefed on which state’s law 
applies under a choice-of-law analysis or on what that state’s 
law requires for CNA to be liable as alleged in the Montana 
Claims. Instead, we vacate this portion of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision and remand for it to make this 
determination. 
 Though we rely on the plain language of the statute, 
we note this mode of analysis is also supported by the 
structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code as it pertains to 
asbestos liability in bankruptcy. The incentive for third 
parties, particularly insurers, to contribute to an asbestos 
personal injury trust is their diminished exposure to asbestos 
liability from the asbestos debtor’s conduct or claims against 
it. Protecting these third parties from derivative exposure 
                                              
7 Our framework comports with that developed by the Second 
Circuit in Quigley, wherein it looked to the relevant state law 
to determine whether the plaintiff’s rights derived from the 
debtor’s rights and the alleged duty the third party owed to 
the plaintiffs derived from the duty it owed to the debtor. 676 
F.3d at 54–58. 
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resolves lingering uncertainty about their liability and sustains 
the trust’s ability to compensate current and future claimants. 
ii.  The “Statutory Relationship” 
Requirement 
Plaintiffs and CNA contest whether a third-party’s 
“alleged liability . . . arises by reason of” its statutory 
relationship to the debtor, § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), when the third-
party’s liability is a factual consequence (what we know as 
“but-for causation”) or a “legal consequence” of the 
relationship (i.e., “the relationship, in light of the debtor’s 
conduct or the claims asserted against it, [is] a legal cause of 
or a legally relevant factor to the third party’s alleged 
liability.”). Quigley, 676 F.3d at 60. The Bankruptcy Court 
did not adopt either interpretation. Rather, it decided that, 
even assuming the “legal consequence” standard applied, 
“[t]he basis for the alleged undertakings by CNA (i.e., 
industrial hygiene services or inspections of Grace’s 
facilities) arise wholly out of the insurance relationship,” and 
accordingly the insurance relationship is “legally relevant” to 
the Montana Claims. W.R. Grace, 2016 WL 6068092, at *13. 
It cited to § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, from 
which it stated the Montana Claims stem. Id. at *12. 
 We do not disturb the Bankruptcy Court’s assumption 
that CNA’s provision of insurance to Grace must be a 
“legally relevant factor” to its alleged liability.8  But even 
                                              
8 Though CNA calls the required connection “but-for” 
causation, it actually describes a “legal consequence” 
connection: it states its alleged duty (certainly a legally 
relevant factor in negligence claims) derives directly from its 
provision of insurance to Grace, which includes routine 
inspection practices by CNA. Hence we see no conflict 
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under this assumption, the Court should review the applicable 
law to determine the relationship’s legal relevance to the 
third-party’s alleged liability.9 Similar to the “derivative 
liability” analysis above, the Court should examine the 
elements necessary to make the Montana Claims under the 
applicable law (here, state law), and determine whether 
CNA’s provision of insurance to Grace is relevant legally to 
those elements. At this juncture, the record is not sufficiently 
developed for us to undertake that analysis, prompting us also 
to remand for the Bankruptcy Court to do so.  
C.  Jurisdiction 
Next, the Montana Plaintiffs argue the Settlement 
Agreement provision allowing for $13 million in 
reimbursements to CNA for any payments made for asbestos 
personal injury claims does not confer jurisdiction on the 
Bankruptcy Court to enjoin the Montana Claims. Whether the 
Court had jurisdiction was not an issue before it. Rather, the 
Court discussed its jurisdiction in the context of addressing 
the Montana Plaintiffs’ argument that third-party-claims 
channeling injunctions under § 524(g)(4) are limited to claims 
against insurance proceeds. The Court rejected this argument 
and stated correctly that the relevant jurisdictional inquiry is 
whether the claims affect the assets of the bankruptcy estate. 
                                                                                                     
between the parties’ suggested interpretations of the statute’s 
requirement. 
 
9 We reach no conclusion on whether § 324A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to the Montana Claims 
because, as already stated, we have not been fully briefed on 
what state’s law applies under a choice-of-law analysis. Nor 
have we been briefed on whether that State applies the 
Restatement provision as its own law.  
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In this case the indemnification provision in Grace and 
CNA’s Settlement Agreement does so.  
We agree with CNA’s argument that the Montana 
Plaintiffs misread our precedent in Combustion Engineering 
and jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court. Thus we 
address the issue only briefly. In that case, we reiterated our 
oft-repeated Pacor standard for “related to” jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy: a proceeding is “related to” a Chapter 11 
proceeding if “the outcome of that proceeding could 
conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered 
in bankruptcy.” 391 F.3d at 226 (citing Pacor, Inc. v. 
Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), overruled in part 
by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 
(1995)) (emphasis omitted); see also Nuveen Mun. Trust v. 
WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293–95 (3d Cir. 
2012). “‘[R]elated to’ jurisdiction [exists] over actions 
[against] non-debtors involv[ing] contractual indemnity 
obligations between the debtor and non-debtor that 
automatically result in indemnification liability against the 
debtor.” Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 226. Such is the case 
here, as the Trust is obligated by contract to indemnify CNA 
up to $13 million for its asbestos personal injury liability 
within the meaning of § 524(g)(4). Hence we do not doubt the 
Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Injunction. 
IV.  Conclusion 
We affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the 
Montana Claims are included in the terms of the Injunction. 
We vacate its decision that the Montana Claims may be 
enjoined under § 524(g)(4) and (as we see no defect in its 
jurisdiction to enforce the Injunction) remand to it with 
guidelines. First, to determine whether a claim seeks to hold a 
third party derivatively liable for the debtor, the Court must 
decide whether the third-party’s alleged liability is “wholly 
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separate” from the debtor’s liability under the applicable law 
or instead depends on it. Second, even assuming the statutory 
relationship must be a “legally relevant factor” to the third-
party’s alleged liability, the Court should decide whether it is 
relevant to the elements required for the liability alleged 
under the applicable law.  
 Thus we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part 
to the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
